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This Article examines an issue that many corporations, trusts, not-
for-profit corporations, and other entities should consider:  
whether the choice of legal form matters?  Is it significant, for 
example, that a corporation organizes as a corporation as 
opposed to a trust, or vice versa?  Ultimately, the Article 
concludes that entity choice in fact is not as important as one may 
previously have thought.  In reaching that conclusion, this Article 
examines converging corporate and trust laws in addition to 
governing standards, and takes an in depth look at Alaska Native 
Corporations and Hawaii’s Bishop Estate, both of which help 
illustrate the non-traditional corporate and trust functions 
performed by such entities.  From these examinations, it is clear 
that governance is governance regardless of the choice of legal 
form, a valuable lesson for every legal entity today. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the modern era, many entities exist that no longer fit neatly 
into the existing legal categories, such as partnership, corporation, 
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limited liability company, limited partnership, not-for-profit 
corporation, mutual-benefit corporation, trust, charitable trust, or 
charity.  Many entities exhibit attributes of three, four, or even five 
types of legal entities; they are indeterminate.1  The question this 
Article asks is if the choice of legal entity makes any difference or 
as big of a difference as it did more than thirty years ago,2 and, 
accordingly, how directors and senior executives of such entities 
should conduct themselves.  Does it remain a useful endeavor to 
shoehorn them into this or that legal category?  What legal 
consequences flow from the choice?  Have those consequences 
lessened over time?  Does entity choice matter any more, as many 
people feel it does, and if so, for how much? 
These questions are examined below in two contexts that have 
traditionally had very different laws and governance standards: the 
corporation and the charitable trust.  This examination reveals that:  
the differences in the law and governance practices in corporations 
and charitable trusts have blurred over time.  And, as the law and 
governance practices have converged, the choice of legal form has 
become less important. 
To illustrate that entity choice is not as important as it once 
was, this Article looks at two unique entities:  the Alaska Native 
Corporation and the Bishop Estate (a charitable trust).  In 1971, 
Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA).3  ANCSA bestowed upon Alaska Natives forty-four 
million acres of land and $1 billion. Rather than to Natives 
themselves, ANCSA bestowed the land and money on 13 regional 
and 203 village corporations, all of which obtained certificates as 
business corporations under Alaska law.4  Despite certificates as 
 
 1. The greatest proliferation of new entities and new types of entity has been 
in the area of limited liability companies (LLCs), attributed principally to the 
flexibility LLC forms are thought to bestow on owners.  See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, 
Unlimited Limited Liability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407 (1999).  Comparatively, the 
vastly increased amount of flexibility that modern corporation laws now contain 
has received little attention.  An exception is Dennis S. Karjala, A Second Look at 
Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1980) (arguing that 
there is no need for special legislation because mainline statutes have become 
sufficiently flexible). 
 2. The author explored the question of what state corporate laws should 
require of Native corporations in 1979.  See Douglas M. Branson, Square Pegs in 
Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Corporations Under Corporate 
Law, 8 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 103, 125–31 (1979). 
 3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–28 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 196–98 
(1978).  Two-hundred and three village corporations were eligible to receive land 
and money, and all were originally chartered as business (“profit”) corporations 
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business corporations, however, ANCSA corporations shift from 
role to role.  They act as political entities, business corporations, 
not-for-profit corporations, and social service agencies, sometimes 
doing so over time while at other times simultaneously.5  Observers 
urge that, despite being corporations in law, ANCSA corporations 
take on these various colorations at various times.6 
A similar situation is found in Hawaii in the form of the 
Bishop Estate, which is a charitable trust.  Beatrice Pauahi Bishop 
(1831–1884), a member of the Hawaiian royal family, left her 
landownings, the largest in Hawaii, in trust “to erect and maintain 
in the Hawaiian Islands two schools . . . called the Kamehameha 
Schools.”7  The schools were to give “preference to Hawaiians of 
pure or part aboriginal blood.”8  The trust became the “wealthiest 
charity in the United States,” with assets well over $10 billion,9  
making it third among United States foundations and greater in 
size than all but five of 746 university endowments.10  Yet the five 
 
under Alaska law.  Id.  Most Alaska Natives who enrolled in the 1970s did so in a 
regional and in a village corporation, but not all.  Several thousand Alaska 
Natives, known as “at large” shareholders, hold shares in a regional but not in a 
village or urban corporation.  See, e.g, Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220 (9th  
Cir. 1999) (claim by at large shareholders). 
 5. See Branson, supra note 2, at 125–31. 
 6. See, e.g., Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997) 
(upholding argument that discriminatory payments amount to a “social welfare 
program” under ANCSA); see also David Case, Listen to the Canary: A Reply to 
Professor Branson, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 218–19 (1987) (analogies to tribal 
governments and tribes). 
 7. SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST 301 app. (2006). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 51. 
 10. The largest ten foundations are:  1. Bill and Melinda Gates - $29.1 billion; 
2. Ford - $11.6 billion; 3. Robert Wood Johnson - $9.1 billion; 4. The Lily 
Endowment - $8.4 billion; 5. W.W. Kellogg - $7.3 billion; 6. William and Flora 
Hewlett - $7.1 billion; 7. David and Lucille Packard - $5.8 billion; 8. Andrew W. 
Mellon - $5.5 billion; 9. John and Catherine MacArthur - $5.4 billion; and            
10. Gordon and Betty Moore - $5.2 billion.  Noelle Barton, Caroline Preston & 
Ian Wilhelm, Slow Growth at the Biggest Foundations, CHRONICLE OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 23, 2006, at 6, 7.  The largest university endowments are:    
1. Harvard University - $25.5 billion; 2. Yale University - $15.2 billion; 3. Stanford 
University - $12.2 billion; 4. University of Texas System - $11.6 billion;                   
5. Princeton University - $11.2 billion; 6. Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 
$6.7 billion; 7. University of California System - $5.2 billion; 8. Columbia 
University - $5.2 billion; 9. Texas A&M University - $5.0 billion; and 10. Michigan 
University System - $4.9 billion.  Erin Strout, College Endowments Post 
‘Respectable’ Returns for 2005.  THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 27, 
2005, at App. 1. 
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trustees ran the Bishop trust as a small charity, at times as if it was 
a partnership and at other times as if it was an adjunct to a political 
party. 
Parts II and III provide an overview of the evolution of 
corporate law and corporate governance over the last thirty or so 
years.  Many changes in corporate law and corporate governance 
practice have occurred in this time, and an understanding of each is 
the starting point for any discussion about the importance of 
corporate form. 
Part IV examines the question of whether entity choice 
matters in the context of Alaska Native Corporations.  Through an 
examination of the hybrid roles that Native corporations play, this 
Article concludes that form is not as important as it was thirty 
years ago.  Although technically corporations, Alaska Native 
Corporations perform many non-traditional corporate functions, 
functions that typically have been assumed by nonprofit 
corporations, trusts, political entities, and social service agencies.  
Although by serving these roles, Native corporations may provide 
valuable, necessary services, Part IV concludes by suggesting that 
hybridization has some serious consequences for corporate law and 
corporate governance. 
Part V then shifts to an examination of the law and 
governance practices of charitable trusts.  Although differences 
remain between trust and corporate law, Part V identifies the areas 
where trust law has converged with corporate law.  Part VI 
concludes with an examination of the Bishop Estate.  Although the 
Bishop Estate was organized as a trust, it served many non-trust 
functions.  Thus, just as with Alaska Native Corporations, the 
choice of entity was less relevant.  Unlike Alaska Native 
Corporations, however, mismanagement of the Bishop Estate led 
to a number of tragic consequences.  Alaska Native Corporations 
should heed this tale of mismanagement, because in an 
environment where form matters less, proper governance—not just 
proper trust governance or proper corporate governance—matters 
more. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE LAW 
A. Change in the Board of Directors’ Mission 
Historically, the dominant legal entity form for business 
enterprises has been the corporation, but corporate law has not 
stood still.  Older corporate statutes required boards of directors to 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  That 
imperative, however, has given way to a softer phrasing:  
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“corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, 
and the business and affairs managed by or under the direction of, 
[the] board of directors.”11  The reality is that modern directors do 
not manage, at least in corporations of size.  Instead, they oversee 
the management and perhaps provide strategic direction to the 
corporation.  The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance and Structure attempts to align legal requirements with 
reality by providing that “[t]he management of the business of a 
publicly held corporation should be conducted by or under the 
supervision of such senior executive officers as are designated by 
the board of directors.”12  Therefore, the highest calling of a board 
of directors becomes to select, monitor, and, if necessary, replace 
the senior executive officers of the corporation, most particularly 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).13 
 
 11. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984).  See also ALASKA STAT.                    
§ 10.06.450(a) (2006). 
 12. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994). 
 13. See, e.g., id. § 3.02(a)(1).  Boards of directors are to “[s]elect, regularly 
evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where appropriate, replace the principal 
senior executives.”  Id.  In corporate settings, the shareholders monitor the 
directors who, as a board, monitor the senior executives.  There are watchers 
watching the watchers, so to speak.  Post-Enron and post-WorldCom, many 
politicians, regulators, and other onlookers have abandoned the model, 
attempting to put directors (most of whom are part-time) back in the business of 
managing.  In the last several years, for example, the Model Business Corporation 
Act section 8.01 has been amended by the addition of a new subsection (c).  This 
subsection states: 
In the case of a public company, the board’s oversight responsibilities 
include attention to: 
(i) business performance and plans; 
(ii) major risks to which the corporation may be exposed; 
(iii) the performance and compensation of senior officers; 
(iv) policies and practices to foster the corporation’s compliance with law 
and ethical conduct; 
(v) preparation of the corporation’s financial statements; 
(vi) the effectiveness of the corporation’s internal controls; 
(vii) arrangements for providing adequate and timely information to 
directors; and 
(viii) the composition of the board and its committees, taking into 
account the important role of independent directors. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(c) (2005).  See also Douglas M. Branson, Too 
Many Bells?  Too Many Whistles?  Corporate Governance in the Post-Enron, Post- 
WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 109–11 (2006). 
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B. Enhanced Committee Structures 
Today, company boards organize through a committee 
structure.  Modern corporate laws facilitate board supervision and 
oversight by authorizing the creation of a wide array of board 
committees.14  The principal committees are the audit, the 
nominating, and compensation committees.15  Individual boards of 
directors may also have one or more legacy committees, such as 
finance, capital improvements, social responsibility, and so on.16  
The newest committees to appear have been the risk management 
committee, which oversees implementation by management of a 
reporting and early warning system to ward off criminal or 
regulatory contretemps, and the disclosure committee, which often 
functions as a subcommittee of the board’s audit committee. 
C. Board Composition:  Legal Requirements 
There are no particular legal requirements for being a 
director.  Older formulations required directors to exercise “care 
and skill.”  Modern commentators, however, deny that any skill 
 
 14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005) (“Unless this Act, the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws provide otherwise, a board of directors may create 
one or more committees and appoint one or more members of the board of 
directors to serve on any such committee.”).  This section further provides that 
“each committee may exercise the powers of the board of directors.”  Id.                
§ 8.25(d);  see also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.468 (2006). 
 15. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3A.02–.05, at 114–33 (1994); DOUGLAS M. 
BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.04–.07, at 234–43 (1993). 
 16. In the 1960s, corporations often had but a single committee, styled as the 
executive committee, which had the power of the full board, save for items 
enumerated in corporate law.  Today’s Model Business Corporation Act 
empowers directors to create “one or more committees.”  There is no mention of 
an executive committee.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005).  Cf. ALASKA 
STAT. § 10.06.468 (2006) (“[A board of directors] “may designate from among its 
members an executive committee and other committees of the board.”).  The 
executive committee exercised the board’s power between meetings of the full 
board.  Usually the CEO, another senior executive, such as the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO), and the heads of principal subsidiaries or divisions made up the 
executive committee.  Today, executive committees are seen infrequently for the 
reason that they permit an inner circle, usually dominated by insiders, to hijack 
governance of the corporation.  The remaining board members, more than ever, 
become the “parsley on the fish.”  Even if the remaining directors wish to play a 
greater role in governance, costs will hinder collective action by them sufficient to 
overcome actions of a powerful executive committee.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. 
BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE 135 (2007). 
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ever was a prerequisite for the position.17  These latter 
commentators in fact won out in the drafting of the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA), which provides that directors “shall 
discharge their duties with the care that a person in like position 
would reasonably believe appropriate under the circumstances.”18  
Once she becomes a director, however, a person must come up to 
the speed necessary to perform a director’s responsibilities in that 
corporation.19  
D. Specialist Directors 
There is no such thing as an honorary, ceremonial, advisory, or 
specialized director.20  Each director must bring to bear her abilities 
across the full spectrum of matters that come to the board.  In the 
past, one would occasionally come across specialized directors, 
denominated as such, for example a director charged with 
oversight over a particular geographical region or state.  Today, 
however, the practice is to place specialists, either by expertise or 
geography, such as the technical wizards in a software company, on 
advisory boards.21 
Nominating committees, often known as governance 
committees, choose directors based upon strengths the candidates 
possess and the board feels it needs.  A current vogue, for example, 
is to select one or two directors with international experience.  
Furthermore, the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) requires 
that at least one member of the board’s audit committee be a 
 
 17. Orbel Sebring, Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the 
Model Business Corporation Act, 30 BUS. LAW. 501, 505 (1975) (“While the cases 
are replete with discussions of the need for directors to use . . . skill . . . [,]there is a 
paucity of authority as to what ‘skill’ and ‘diligence,’ as distinguished from ‘care,’ 
are properly to be expected from a corporate director. . . .  In point of fact, skill, in 
the sense of technical competence in a particular field, has never been regarded as 
a qualification for the office of director. . . .  Accordingly, the words ‘diligence’ 
and ‘skill’ were omitted from the standard adopted.”). 
 18. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005).  Alaska’s standard of conduct 
for directors is more objective than the most recent Model Act iterations, and 
makes express a duty of inquiry:  “with the care, including reasonable inquiry, that 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances.”  ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006).  It does not import skill into 
the equation and, in that respect, is consonant with the Model Act. 
 19. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981) 
(spouse became director after husband’s death); BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.05, 
at 264. 
 20. See generally BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.17, at 279. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.  
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director who is a “financial expert,” defined by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as one with hands on experience in auditing 
public corporations.22  Boards may search for individual members 
of stature as well as for those with certain technical expertise, such 
as in engineering, finance, or computing.  Those are strengths, not 
specialties.  It is important to note that a corporate director must 
still bring to bear the requisite amount of care and loyalty to each 
matter that comes to the full board’s attention, just as co-trustees 
must.23 
E. Duty of Loyalty 
A corporate director’s duty is in every instance to serve the 
best interests of the corporation rather than the best interests of 
one’s self, family members, friends, associates, or other businesses 
in which the director may have an interest.24  Shareholder plaintiffs 
and their lawyers often perceive conflicts of interest as major 
violations of this fiduciary duty, sins that violate a moral code 
governing behavior as well as the law.  They are not.  The aim for 
which the law strives, and after the fact may award damages for 
breach, is compliance with the duty of loyalty (the duty to serve the 
best interests of the entity).  That being said, a conflict of interest is 
a warning sign to which the fiduciary and her lawyer must pay 
special attention, because, in the least, the appearance of a duty of 
loyalty violation may be imminent.  Added procedural steps may 
need to be taken at this stage.  “[C]onflicts of interest in the 
modern charity world [, for example,] are a problem to be managed 
rather than a disease to be eradicated.”25 
For example, if an organization proposes to hire the child of a 
director for the role of marketing director, both the director and 
the organization can manage the affair as an interested director 
transaction.  In doing so, the interested director can make full 
disclosure, recuse herself (although statutes do not require that she 
do so), and have the transaction approved by a disinterested 
decision maker (usually the other directors but sometimes the 
 
 22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265(b) (Supp. III 2003). 
 23. For example, delegation to a committee of the board relieves neither the 
full board nor committee members from their legal responsibilities.  See MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.25(f) (2005) (“The creation of, delegation of authority to, or 
action by a committee does not alone constitute compliance by a director with 
standards of conduct . . . .”); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.468(d) (2006) (providing for 
the same). 
 24. Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1880); BRANSON, supra 
note 15, § 8.02, at 394–96. 
 25. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, at xxxvi (2006). 
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shareholders).26  Laws of every jurisdiction contain safe harbor 
provisions sanitizing an interested director transaction that the 
director and corporation manage in that way.27  There are of course 
other options a director or senior executive of a  business entity 
may choose to manage conflicts of interest.28 
F. Approval of Trustee and Director Compensation 
Corporate directors, of course, have a conflict of interest in 
setting their own compensation qua directors.  Statutes, however, 
obviate the conflict.29  Therefore, managing of the traditional sort 
becomes unnecessary. 
That statutory background does not end the matter.  One of 
the teachings of Enron is that excessive director compensation can 
taint an otherwise capable board of directors.  Enron paid its 
directors $350,000 per year, roughly half in stock and half in cash.  
Additionally, the corporation paid from $70,000 to $500,000 in 
charitable gifts or consulting fees to entities with which the 
fourteen so-called “independent” directors were affiliated.30  
Directors in a corporation or trustees in a large charity are 
supposed to watch the watchers, or watch the doers/watchers, the 
 
 26. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02(a) (1994) (authorization or ratification 
by disinterested directors). 
 27. See id. at 235–36, 238–40 (describing safe harbor statutes of fifty-two 
jurisdictions and including a table of disclosure provisions for various safe harbor 
statutes).  In Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987), the Supreme Court of 
Delaware made clear that such statutes are non-exclusive and a director or 
controlling shareholder, when challenged, could escape liability based upon the 
fairness of the transaction, even though the fiduciary had not complied with the 
statute. 
 28. For example, directors faced with an apparent conflict of interest can 
choose to do nothing.  If the child in the example above is eminently qualified for 
the position, no damage or potential for damage exists as it might when the child 
has meager qualifications.  In the former case, the duty of loyalty is not violated.  
A third way to manage the transaction would be for the interested party to resign 
from the board of directors.  Finally, the choice not to do the transaction at all 
could be adopted. 
 29. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.11 (2005) (“Unless the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors may fix the 
compensation of directors.”). 
 30. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 54–57 (2002); Douglas 
M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to 
Corporate Governance Reform, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1019–20 (2003). 
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senior executives.  One of a director’s highest callings is to 
reprimand or remove senior executives, mainly the CEO, if in the 
board’s judgment that is necessary.  Overly compensated directors 
will have less of an incentive to rock the boat if down the road they 
could lose their directorship and the emoluments of office that go 
with it.  There does not exist any conflict of interest or duty of 
loyalty violation one can put their finger on; instead, experience 
teaches that excessive compensation for directors corrupts the 
system, presenting a moral hazard for the individual director.31 
G. Level of Compensation 
What level of compensation is excessive?  In Marx v. Akers, 
the New York Court of Appeals declined to find as a matter of law 
that $75,000 in annual compensation was excessive.32  Richard 
Breeden, as corporate monitor, required that emerging from 
bankruptcy as MCI, Inc., WorldCom pay its directors no less than 
$150,000 annually.33  Conference Board of the United States 
statistics show that fees directors in large, publicly held 
corporations receive are well below the $350,000 received at 
Enron.  Average director compensation for directors in 2002 was: 
(1) $59,000 in the diversified financial services industries,              
(2) $55,500 at petroleum companies, (3) $54,500 in the 
telecommunications industry, (4) $48,500 in the gas and electric 
industry, and (5) $48,000 in the industrial chemicals industry.34 
 
 31. Corporate governance expert Charles Elson has opined that it is per se 
wrongful for directors to receive any compensation from the corporation other 
than a director’s fees.  Branson, supra note 30, at 1020 (“[Directors] should have 
‘no financial connection to the company whatsoever’. . . .  If a director’s role is as a 
consultant, hire him as a consultant.  If a director’s role is to be as a director, hire 
him as a director.  You cannot blend the two.”). 
 32. 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1042–43 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that the compensation 
package included $55,000 cash and 100 shares of IBM common stock).  IBM later 
raised the annual retainer to $100,000, along with modest stock option grants.  
Early in 2007, IBM announced a $200,000 annual flat fee compensation scheme, 
citing the potential corrupting influence of stock grants, which it eliminated 
altogether.  Joann S. Lublin & William M. Bulkeley, IBM Ends Director Stock 
Options, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at A1. 
 33. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO HON. JED S. 
RAKOFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW 
YORK § 3.01, at 78 (2004). 
 34. CHARLES PECK, HENRY M. SILVERT & GINA MCCORMICK, THE 
CONFERENCE BOARD, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION, AND BOARD PRACTICES IN 
2002, at 6.  The amount directors receive in restricted stock grants and options 
tends to be small but increases total compensation and changes the categories, as 
follows: (1) oil and gas services, $96,028; (2) chemicals, $76,805; (3) diversified 
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Pre-SOX, a California court held that receipt of $235,000 in 
fees by a firm did not cause a partner of that firm to lose his status 
as an independent director of Chevron, Inc.35  Post-Enron and post-
SOX, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) regulations fix the 
level of compensation a consultant or her firm may receive without 
having to be classified as non-independent at $100,000 per year.36  
Of course, loss of independence does not equate to banishment.  
Instead, loss of independent status simply means that:  (1) a 
director’s vote may no longer be the swing vote on board tallies;  
(2) she may no longer serve on the audit committee; and (3) she 
may not count in the director counting exercise, which leads to the 
determination that a clear majority of independent directors 
approved the transaction and that the transaction is entitled to 
“enhanced” business judgment rule protection.37  Rather than 
banishment, therefore, possession of these deficits often may, but 
not necessarily will, result in loss of the person’s position as a 
director. 
III.  EVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. Background 
Corporate governance is not law, although many law schools 
offer the subject.  Rather, among other things, corporate 
governance is a meld of mandatory legal requirements, enabling 
legal provisions, and business and management science tools and 
devices.  For the most part, corporate governance is soft law—
advisory and aspirational, a larger concentric circle around laws, 
such as corporate statutes and cases—or quasi-laws—such as 
NASDAQ or stock exchange rules, which contain mandatory 
content and form smaller circles within the larger circle of 
 
financial services, $76,750; (4) food, beverage, and tobacco, $72,894; and              
(5) plastics and rubber manufacture, $71,200.  Id. at 8. 
 35. Katz v. Chevron, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 689–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 36. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 3.03A.02(b)(ii) (2004), available at 
http://www.nccg.ru/en/site.xp/057053049124.html. The NASDAQ governance 
regulations decree loss of independence any time a director or her firm receive 
$60,000 or more annually from the corporation on whose board she sits.  
NASDAQ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES CHANGES (2003), available at   
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf. 
 37. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 
1987) (“[W]ith the independent directors in the majority, proof that the board 
acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced.”). 
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“corporate governance.”38  Precepts of modern corporate 
governance speak to the following:  board size, elimination of 
trophy directors, board and boardroom decorum, director training, 
director performance reviews, and standards of the corporation. 
B. Board Size 
Wise corporate governance practice holds that a board of 
directors should neither be too large given the size of the 
corporation (thirteen or fifteen, potentially even seven or nine for a 
smaller corporation), nor too small (just one or three, or even five 
for a larger entity).  The average board size of NYSE listed 
corporations was 9.2 persons in 2003.39  The number of directors 
ranged from three to thirty-one.  Average board sizes in the S&P 
500, the 500 largest corporations by revenue, was 10.9 directors.40  
The mode among the Fortune 200 was eleven in 2000, twelve in 
2001, and eleven again in 2002.  The trend is toward smaller boards, 
often having only seven or nine directors.41 
C. Elimination of Trophy Directors 
Many corporations eschew hiring or retaining directors who 
serve on several other boards of directors.  Similarly, many publicly 
held companies forbid their CEOs to sit on any other boards of 
directors, or limit the CEO to a single board.42  Directors who sit on 
four or more boards of directors become trophy directors.43  
 
 38. See, e.g., JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE at 4 (2d ed. 2005); see 
also Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
Importance of Soft Law and International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669 (2000). 
 39. Board Basics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R7 (table). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See BRANSON, supra note 16, at 144–45 (2007). 
 42. See Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say ‘No Thanks’ to Board Seats, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2005, at B1. 
 43. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 16, at 155; see also Judith Dobrzynski, 
When Directors Play Musical Chairs, N.Y. TIMES MONEY & BUSINESS, Nov. 17, 
1996, at 1 (reporting of a director who held eighteen board seats in the 1950s).  A 
number of trophy directors still exist.  Shirley Jackson, for example, the president 
of Renesselaer Polytechnic Institute sits on seven boards of directors, including 
Marathon Oil, US Steel, AT&T, Federal Express, Public Service Enterprise, and 
Medtronic.  Susan Bayh, the wife of Indiana Senator Evan Bayh, sits on eight 
boards of directors, including Wellpoint Health Networks, Anthem Insurance, 
Dandereon, Novavax, Curis, Ennis Communications, and Golden State Foods.  
BRANSON, supra note 16, at 97–99. 
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Corporate governance eyes trophy directors warily or simply does 
not countenance them at all.44 
D. Board and Boardroom Decorum 
Boards generally observe high standards of decorum.  
Individual directors phrase criticisms in the form of 
recommendations, advice, or suggestions.  Because the directors 
have fully vetted most matters before they come to a vote, many 
votes are recorded in board minutes as having been unanimous.  
Matters as to which substantial disagreement exists simply do not 
make it to the voting stage.45 
There is nothing unusual about this.  Board members serve a 
number of years together in a small circle of individuals.  They 
cannot engage in the confrontational or even combative style found 
in legislature or faculty meetings.  Instead, a directors’ job is to 
walk softly and to carry a big stick (removal of the CEO) and 
possibly to aid in giving strategic direction to the corporation.46 
E. Director Training 
Pre-SOX, training for directors was rare, consisting at most of 
a lecture or two by corporate counsel on fiduciary duties, in the 
abstract.  Post-SOX, a number of law and business schools now 
offer week long courses for directors, which often have financial 
content, making directors conversant with weighed average cost of 
capital (WACC), return on capital employed (ROCE), or earnings 
before depreciation, interest, taxes and amortization (EBDITA).  
 
 44. Another subspecies of director governance that experts eye warily is the 
celebrity director.  CEOs at American Express (James Robinson), Hollinger 
International (Conrad Black), Morrison Knudsen (William Agee), and Walt 
Disney Company (Michael Eisner), among others, stand accused of having used 
celebrity directors to delay their own comeuppance.  For a discussion of the issue 
in the case of CEO Michael Eisner of the Walt Disney Company, see JAMES B. 
STEWART, DISNEY WAR 214, 279–80 (2005). 
 45. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR THE CORPORATE SAVIOR:  THE 
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 84–85 (2002) (“The sense of 
internal cohesion on a corporate board . . . is reinforced . . . by the existence of 
group norms. . . .  There is a strong emphasis on politeness and courtesy, and an 
avoidance of direct conflict and confrontation.”). 
 46. At the Bishop Estate, trustee meetings were the opposite; they had the 
“shoot to kill” debating society flavor.  See KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 88, 148–
49 (“[Trustee] Jervis threw a rolled-up copy of the Sunday Advertiser at [minority 
trustee Oz] Stender.  Then Peters berated Stender, calling him a traitor.  Peters 
looked like he was going to hit Stender, but then Jervis stepped between them, 
cursing Stender and shouting.”). 
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Restoring Trust, written by Richard Breeden while corporate 
monitor at WorldCom (later MCI, Inc.), requires both initial and 
refresher training for rank and file directors as well as for audit 
committee members.47 
F. Director Performance Reviews 
Had Enron required a 360-degree review of its corporate 
officers, Andrew Fastow, the wrongdoing Chief Financial Officer, 
never would have gotten far in his fraud.48  In such a review, peers, 
superiors, and subordinates all conduct performance reviews, 
including reviews of director performance.  Good governance 
advocates call for such reviews in, for example, the governance 
committee’s charter.49  A committee charter could also spell out the 
consequences if a director failed to receive a sufficient mark in, for 
example, three successive reviews.50 
G. Standards of the Corporation 
A corporate board may be able to relieve the burden of 
managing numerous and repetitive conflicts of interest and thus 
potentially avoid duty-of-loyalty violations.  In cases in which the 
problem likely will repeat itself, the full board may delegate the 
management to a mid-level corporate executive likely to have no 
interest in the matter.  In that way, the full board need not 
entertain every request to use additional space on the corporate 
aircraft, or to reserve off-season space in the corporate hunting or 
golf lodge.  The ALI Corporate Governance Project enshrines such 
a delegation as a “standard of the corporation.”51  Ultimately, it 
adds another neutral decision-maker that directors or boards may 
utilize in conflict-of-interest transactions, at least those that are not 
major transactions. 
 
 47. See BREEDEN, supra note 33, at 54–55 (suggesting initial and annual 
refresher training for all directors); id. at 107 (suggesting additional annual 
training for directors on the audit committee). 
 48. See Branson, supra note 30, at 1018. 
 49. See, e.g., Francie Dalton, All-Around Feedback:  Harness the Power of 360-
Degree Mechanisms, 24 LEGAL MGMT. 14 (2005); Robert J. Derocher, 360 Degree 
Evaluations:  A Case Study from the D.C. Bar, 27 BAR LEADER 23 (2002). 
 50. The Bishop Estate provides an example of a charter that does not provide 
for adequate performance reviews.  See infra Part VI and accompanying text; see 
also KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 101 (“[T]here were no job descriptions, 
performance standards, or annual reviews . . . .”). 
 51. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.36 (1994). 
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IV.  CORPORATE LAW,  
GOVERNANCE, AND ANCSA CORPORATIONS 
As a matter of form, Alaska Native Corporations are 
technically corporations.  However, they perform many non-
corporate functions.  Part A below discusses the various shapes 
that Native corporations take.  Part B discusses a few of the 
consequences relating to corporate governance associated with the 
hybrid nature of Native corporations. 
A. ANC Non-Corporate Functions 
1. Delivery of Social Services.  Many corporations provide 
college and university scholarships for youths, who must be Alaska 
Natives and must be descendants of shareholders or shareholders 
themselves.  Village corporations fund health clinics in their 
respective villages.  They also operate food banks whose bounty 
goes exclusively to Alaska Natives. 
Although these activities are laudable, they are often aimed 
only at Alaska Natives, in such a way that shareholder and creditor 
concerns may be overlooked.  Native corporations, for example, 
have attempted to put corporations’ lands beyond creditors’ and 
disgruntled shareholders’ reach.  In Jimerson v. Tetlin Native 
Corporation,52 the corporation conveyed 643,174 of 743,174 acres of 
land that the corporation owned to the not-for-profit Tetlin Tribal 
Council.  In Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp.,53 another village 
corporation placed $35 million received from the IRS into a 
settlement trust.  Viewed through a cynical lens, conveyances to 
settlement trusts and tribal councils re-slice the ANCSA pie.  
While ANCSA provisions shield conveyances to trusts from 
judicial scrutiny, arguably settlement trusts were intended to insure 
protection of historic cultural sites, not wholesale conveyances to 
put cash, land, and other assets beyond both creditors’ and 
shareholders’ control.54  By using the ANCSA provisions in this 
way, the potential to benefit from the 1971 settlement is 
compromised for a significant group of Alaska Natives, not only 
including those who have moved away and receive no benefit or 
enjoyment from land held in trust, but also including those 
shareholders who stayed but disagree with creating land reserves or 
putting aside extra cash to benefit elders. 
 
 52. 144 P.2d 470, 471 (Alaska 2006). 
 53. 76 P.3d 391, 392–93 (Alaska 2003). 
 54. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1) (2000). 
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To this end, if village corporations wish to have increased 
ability to dispense largess as they see fit, they should convert to 
not-for-profit status.  This author has long held that village 
corporations should give consideration to doing so.55 
2. Provision of Elder Benefits.  Alaska Natives have always 
accorded special status to their elders.  Several regional and village 
corporations have sought to add flesh to the commitment.  They 
have set aside substantial resources to provide elder benefits, 
above distributions to all shareholders.56  Under ANSCA, these 
corporations make distributions (elder benefits) not with respect to 
shares but with respect to shareholders (over sixty-five years of 
age).57  This practice is arguably contrary to traditional corporate 
law principles.58 
However, ANCSA provides, if not for the payments 
themselves, then at a minimum a means for making them.  The Act 
authorizes Native corporations to amend their articles of 
incorporation to provide for “Natives who have obtained the age of 
sixty-five.”59  The corporation may make additional payment to 
elders once a corporation has formally proposed a resolution, 
allowed whatever debate to ensue, obtained a shareholder vote, 
and filed articles of amendment with the Alaska Secretary of State 
authorizing an additional class of shares, and distributed newly 
authorized shares to elders.  Although they are still distributions 
under corporate law, payments are made with respect to shares 
(elder-preference shares), not with respect to shareholders.60  
ANCSA corporations creating a class of elder preference stock 
thus adhere to the existing rule set as modified by ANCSA.61 
 
 55. See Branson, supra note 2, at 134–36. 
 56. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bluemink, Lawsuit Hits CIRI Bonus for Seniors, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, at B-1 (explaining that suits have been 
filed in opposition to providing added financial benefits to original elders in 
Sealaska, Cook Inlet, and Goldbelt Native corporations). 
 57. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000). 
 58. See 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5352 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003). 
 59. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000). 
 60. See, e.g., Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 701–02 (Alaska 2001) 
(creating class of elder preference stock but limiting distribution to “original 
shareholders” while also authorizing distribution regardless of whether an Alaska 
Native still owned any shares of stock in the corporation). 
 61. Which would, of course, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, trump any inconsistent state laws.  See U.S. CONST., art. VI 
(“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land. . . .”). 
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However that may be, ANCSA corporations have chosen less 
arduous routes than amendment of the articles of incorporation.  
Boards of directors have instead allocated corporate funds to 
settlement trusts, also provided for by ANCSA,62 but, again, 
arguably intended to put certain Native historical sites and similar 
lands, not expanses of land or shareholder funds, out of creditors’ 
or shareholders’ reach.63 
Dissident shareholders have mounted a number of challenges 
to the provision of elder benefits.  They have lost them all.  Courts 
have held that settlement trust provisions preempt the state law 
rule of equal treatment.64  Courts have turned back arguments that 
limitation of a benefit to original shareholders amounts to violating 
state law provisions outlawing record dates set more than sixty 
days in advance.65 
In turning back these challenges, courts may be saying several 
things.  One possibility is that the end, the provision of elder 
benefits, justifies the means.  Second, the choice of entity does not 
matter.  ANCSA corporations are not like other business 
corporations, as the ANCSA makes clear.  The normal corporate 
law rules, or some of them, do not apply.  Finally, judges may be 
acting out of political expediency. 
3. Dispensation of “Political” Patronage.  Wisely, Native 
corporations react to the environment that surrounds them.  They 
have branched out into a number of different industries, such as 
provision of security services and homeland-security support.66  
 
 62. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a) (2000). 
 63. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1). 
 64. See, e.g., Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 426–27 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that ANCSA preempts conflicting state laws).  The author served as co-
counsel for plaintiffs in the case.  See also Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 702 
(Alaska 2001).  “Native corporations must have broad discretion to fashion elder 
benefit programs that meet the needs of elders,” overriding any objections based 
upon otherwise applicable state law.  Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Sierra, 25 P.3d at 701–02; ALASKA STAT. 10.06.408(b) (2006) 
(corporations may set record date no more than sixty days in advance).  Goldbelt 
provided for the issuance of elder-preference stock but simultaneously provided 
that the corporation would immediately repurchase the shares.  Sierra, 25 P.3d at 
700.  Plaintiffs complained that the benefit was both underinclusive and 
overinclusive:  the corporation provided the benefit only for elders who had been 
original shareholders but bestowed the benefit on all such elders, whether they 
continued to own common stock or not.  Id. at 701. 
 66. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Scott Higham, Alaska Native 
Corporations Cash in on Contracting Edge, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at 
A-1.  There are now over 200 ANCSA corporations and subsidiaries thereof that 
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Critics opine that Native corporations have branched into too 
many of them.67 
In Alaska itself, political exigencies may influence the business 
decisions of some Native village corporations.  The structure of 
Native corporations makes this possible and maybe even desirable.  
Because the shares in ANCSA corporations have been inalienable, 
each Alaska Native tends to hold the same number of shares.  In 
such a case, in which most holders have 100 shares and a restriction 
exists on transfer, corporate finance experts have predicted that the 
entities will function as political organizations (one person, one 
vote; rather than one share, one vote, as in a business corporation).  
Groups of shareholders, for example, those who stayed behind in 
the Native village, will lobby for and receive benefits from the 
corporation.68 
The extent to which political exigencies influence business 
decisions is not always clear, but in several situations they are at 
least one potential explanation for a decision made by a Native 
corporation.  Boards and management, at times, have formed 
various divisions and subsidiaries to create more jobs.  For 
example, one smaller regional corporation paid $27.8 million to 
shareholders in 2006 in their capacities as employees and apart 
from any dividends or distributions.69  This has had the likely effect 
of garnering more votes and political support for certain Native 
corporations’ board of director incumbents.  An additional, more 
negative effect of these actions has been to overextend Native 
corporations and their management. 
 
operate as “disadvantaged small businesses.”  Id.  They are exempt from even the 
$3 million ($5 million in construction) cap on no-bid contracts that are in place for 
other minority small businesses.  See id. 
 67. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow & Scott Higham, Some Post 9-11 Awards 
Given Without Bids to Native Alaskans [sic], WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at 
A-4 (arguing that Native corporations receive inordinate amount of no-bid 
homeland security contracts that may not be beneficial to the general public). 
 68. See Jonathan Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, Share 
Transferability, and Firm Performance:  Evidence from ANCSA Corporations, 24 
J. FIN. ECON. 69, 99 (1989) (arguing that, due to transferability restrictions, 
shareholders wage political-style campaigns to gain support of other shareholders 
and to influence management); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, 
The Structure and Performance of Alaska Native Corporations, 10 CONTEMP. 
POL’Y ISSUES 71, 83 (1992) (explaining that management of Settlement Trusts 
“would likely become politicized, much like many current aspects of the 
corporations”). 
 69. E. Budd Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations, 
BUSINESS LAW TODAY, July/Aug. 2007, at 37–38. 
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Another corporation provided commercial transportation 
from a remote village to a remote logging site where village 
corporation shareholders acted as stevedores.70  In that case, the 
plaintiff argued that the village corporation was subsidizing the 
lodging of the workers while on-site and likely received little if any 
financial benefit from these maneuvers.  The trial court, though, 
found in favor of the village corporation, and the Alaska Supreme 
Court, under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed this 
decision.71  Nevertheless, it is not clear that actions of the village 
corporation resulted in any real economic benefit.  Political 
exigencies may have helped motivate the actions. 
B. Consequences of Differing Functions 
In serving a variety of non-corporate functions, Native 
corporations often take action that can be construed as contrary to 
accepted corporate governance standards.  With such a variety of 
interests that are often conflicting, directors and managers can 
become overextended and have a difficult time making business 
decisions. 
1. Discriminatory Distributions (Dividends and Other 
Payments).  By serving multiple non-corporate functions that favor 
some shareholders over others, Native corporations often sacrifice 
the widely accepted corporate law rule that the operations of the 
corporation are to be run to the benefit of all shareholders.  One 
such illustration of this phenomenon is discriminatory 
distributions—that is, dividends and other payments made to some 
shareholders, but not others. 
An example of discriminatory distributions dates back to the 
1980s.72  Kake Tribal Corporation, a large village corporation, 
began a program to purchase whole life insurance policies on 
shareholders’ lives. The corporation, however, established 
eligibility criteria. A shareholder had to apply for the benefit, 
 
 70. See Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 24 P.3d 1208, 1210–12 (Alaska 2002) 
(upholding trial court finding that, rather than a distribution subject to the equal 
treatment rule, the corporate subsidy of living and transportation expenses was 
part of a fully disclosed program of shareholder hire). 
 71. But see id. at 1210, 1212 (affirming lower court finding that lodging was not 
subsidized and that potential economic benefit existed). 
 72. The facts are outlined in Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320 
(Alaska 1997).  The author served as co-counsel to plaintiffs and argued the case 
before the Alaska Supreme Court.  Due to the author’s personal involvement in 
the case, the facts provided herein are more illustrative than the factual account in 
the court’s opinion. 
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which she would not know of unless she had remained in the 
village or had received a communication from a friend who had.  
Publicity about the program was word-of-mouth.  Further, the 
applicant had to be over twenty-one years of age.  Lastly, she also 
had to be an original shareholder, with ownership dating to the 
corporation’s formation in 1977.  Because of these limitations, only 
48% of the corporation’s approximately 560 shareholders received 
the insurance benefit. 
Traditional corporate law holds that distributions must be 
uniform across a class of shares.  A corollary holds that the 
corporation makes distributions with respect to shares, not with 
respect to shareholders.  The identity of the shareholder (under 
eighteen, over eighteen, over sixty-five, lives in the village, lives 
outside the village, and so on) is irrelevant.73 
Arlene Hanson, the widow of an original shareholder, sensed 
this and made inquiries into the shareholder insurance benefits.  
The corporation refused to supply her with an application.  She 
consulted an attorney, who, after being rebuffed by the corporation 
as well, brought a class action lawsuit.  The Supreme Court of 
Alaska upheld a judgment for the plaintiffs and expanded an award 
of damages from $47.30 to $98 per share for adults and $121 per 
share for youths.74  The court held that the youths’ minority had 
tolled the statue of limitations.  Eventually, the parties agreed to a 
$7 million settlement. 
Hanson illustrates a court decision limiting a Native 
corporation’s power to distribute benefits to less than all 
shareholders.  However, Native corporations continue to make 
payments to or on behalf of certain, but less than all, 
shareholders.75  Certain portions of the ANCSA seem to authorize 
such distributions.76  Other sections of the ANCSA may seem to, 
but are limited in scope.  For example, one section of the ANCSA 
establishes the “[a]uthority of a Native Corporation to provide 
benefits to its shareholders . . . to promote [their] health, education, 
or welfare. . . . Eligibility for such benefits need not be based on 
 
 73. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 58, § 5352. 
 74. See Hanson, 939 P.2d at 1329–30.  The court gave all shares an amount 
equal to that received by elder shareholders, who had been ineligible for insurance 
and received cash instead.  The six-year statute of limitations, however, cut off at 
$98 per share for adult Alaska Natives.  There was no similar cutoff for youths, for 
whom the statute of limitations had been tolled by their minority.  They received a 
full measure of parity with the elder group, namely $121 per share. 
 75. See Bluemink, supra note 56, at B-1; see also supra Part IV.A.2 (provision 
of elder benefits). 
 76. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000). 
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share ownership . . . and such benefits may be provided on a basis 
other than . . . share ownership.”77  This provision protects 
distributions to some shares, much as a not-for-profit corporation’s 
actions would be protected in dispensation of its largess.  Yet, in all 
probability due to a drafting mistake, the provision only applies to 
regional corporations, not Native village corporations.78 
2. Tendency Toward Management Myopia.  One principal 
reason for the push for independent directors is the hope that, with 
independence, boards of directors will become more diverse, not 
merely in terms of skin color or sex, but of viewpoints and base of 
experience.  By contrast, ANCSA provides that in Native village 
corporations all directors must be Natives.79  At first blush, the 
requirement seems innocuous, a product of the time when 
Congress enacted ANCSA.  But experience shows that Alaska 
Native Corporations often lack the range of viewpoints, 
perspectives, and independence that characterize boards of 
comparably sized public companies. 
3. Suggested Use of Advisory Boards.  Advisory boards of 
directors have become common in the high-tech, banking, and real 
estate fields.  For example, a corporation might create an advisory 
board staffed by persons whose technical expertise is unparalleled, 
but who remain completely unschooled in business or finance.  
Advisory board members receive the same salary and emoluments 
of office as do those individuals whom shareholders elect as 
directors.  Banks often have staff advisory boards for various 
regions as sources of information about trends and business 
practices in disparate areas in which the bank does business.  A 
corrective measure to the management myopia in certain ANCSA 
corporations might be to institute a small, diverse advisory board 
that could supply a wider range of viewpoints and a critical eye that 
is arguably now absent. 
 
 77. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2000). 
 78. ANCSA section 7 governs regional, not village, corporations.  Moreover, 
section 8(c) explicitly states which provisions applicable to regional corporations 
carry over to apply to village corporations and does not include subsection (r).  
See 43 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (2000).  If its drafters intended subsection (r) to permit 
village corporations to deviate from the usual rules applicable to corporations, 
evidently those drafters placed the provision in the wrong place. 
 79. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(f) (2000) (mandating that all directors must be shareholders 
who must, in turn, be Natives). 
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V.  THE REMAINING STRICTURES OF TRUST LAW 
Trust law has traditionally been more restrictive than 
corporate law.  This remains true in many areas, such as with the 
duty of loyalty.  However, in other ways trust and corporate law 
are no longer as far apart. 
A. The Theories 
Some differences between corporate, trust, and other laws are 
theoretical today.  A trust, for example, is a relationship between 
trustees and beneficiaries, not a separate enterprise.  A 
corporation, in contrast, is a separate being.80  At least in the 
abstract, a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible,”81 
separate from its owners, flesh and blood or otherwise, for all 
purposes.  In between, a partnership is schizophrenic.  The original 
Uniform Partnership Act treats a partnership as an aggregate of 
individuals for some purposes and as an entity in its own right for 
others.82  Today’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) 
remains schizophrenic, leaning more toward an entity theory than 
an aggregate theory.83   
B. Duty of Loyalty:  Differing Interested Director and Trustee 
Standards 
As compared to corporate law, trustee law is stricter with 
respect to duty of loyalty transactions.  Trustees, it is well accepted, 
may not purchase at their own sale.  The absolute prohibition 
applies regardless of whether the transaction was fair.84  Thus, the 
range of choices is much narrower when the fiduciary is a trustee 
rather than a corporate director and deals with the trust or with 
trust property.  When the warning flag (that is, a conflict of 
interest) pops up, a trustee, advisor, or both must conclude that the 
 
 80. See, e.g., KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 211. 
 81. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
 82. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 276, Chairman’s prefatory note (1914) 
(describing the dichotomy of the “entity theory” and the “aggregate or common 
law theory,” and adopting the aggregate of individuals associated in business 
theory with “modification”). 
 83. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 6, prefatory note (2003) (“The 
Revised Act enhances the entity treatment of partnerships to achieve simplicity 
for state law purposes, particularly in matters concerning the title to partnership 
property.  RUPA does not, however, relentlessly apply the entity approach.  The 
aggregate approach is retained for some purposes, such as partners’ joint and 
several liability.”). 
 84. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95, at 343 (6th ed. 1987). 
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transaction cannot go forward.  A trustee cannot self-deal 
(“purchase at her own sale”).  The prohibition is absolute.85 
C. Standards of Care May Differ Between Corporation and Trust 
Traditionally, the trustee had to meet a high, objective 
standard of care; namely, the care and skill with which a reasonably 
prudent person would exercise the management of her own 
affairs.86  By contrast, corporate officials have a lower, quasi-
subjective standard.  They need only “discharge their duties with 
the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe 
appropriate in similar circumstances.”87  However, some authorities 
deny that any difference exists any longer.  “Under both the trust 
and corporate legal regimes, the fiduciary must exercise such 
attention to the affairs of the organization (what to do and how to 
do it) as would a prudent person in managing his or her own 
affairs.”88  The objective standard of tort law, the care taken by a 
reasonably prudent person in the circumstances, falls in between 
these two extremes.89 
D. Penalties for Fiduciary Duty Violations 
Whether under trust, corporate law, partnership, or other 
doctrines, the remedies a plaintiff may seek from a feckless 
fiduciary are extreme. The plaintiff may seek money damages 
equivalent to the harm the entity has suffered; the illicit profits the 
fiduciary has gained, even though the entity has suffered no 
positive harm; all gains whether achieved by virtue of the breach or 
through the fiduciary’s independent efforts, often by way of 
imposition of a constructive trust; and disgorgement of all 
compensation received by the defendant during the period a court 
finds him to have been in breach of his duties.90  Arguably, a 
 
 85. See, e.g., Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, 
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 598 (1999) (“A trustee 
who deals directly with the trust will have breached his or her duty of loyalty 
regardless of whether the trustee acted in good faith and regardless of the fairness 
of the transaction.”). 
 86. See IIA AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS § 174, at 466–67 (4th ed. 1987). 
 87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005). 
 88. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 25, at 
17. 
 89. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, §§ 6.02–.03, at 251–57 (comparing and 
contrasting director, trustee and reasonable person standards of care). 
 90. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, § 10.11, at 575–80 (constructive trusts 
and forfeiture of compensation); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 58, § 884.90, at 362–64 
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plaintiff may seek more from a trustee; a court may “surcharge” a 
trustee who has breached his duty.91 
Today, the practice of surcharging a trustee has given way to 
Internal Revenue Code section 4958.  Section 4958 permits the 
Internal Revenue Service to levy an excise tax of twenty-five 
percent on a fiduciary (trustee or not-for-profit director or 
executive) of a charity who receives “excess benefits,” and 200% if 
the situation remains uncorrected.92 
E. Restrictions on Delegations 
Restrictions on delegations are illustrative of the manner in 
which trust and corporate law may differ but also of the way in 
which they are coming closer together.  Traditionally, a trustee 
could only delegate ministerial trust functions.93  Like the prudent 
person standard, the prohibition on delegations limited the ability 
of trustees and trusts to avail themselves of modern portfolio 
management methods.94  The 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
adopted a prudent investor standard in lieu of a prudent person 
standard,95 expressly to permit a trustee to use professional money 
managers in the same way a wealthy individual would.96  The newer 
versions of the Restatement of Trusts reflect the development.97 
Corporations’ boards of directors have always delegated, at 
least in all but the smallest of corporations.  They entrusted to the 
 
(constructive trusts); id. § 888, at 370–72 (liability for profits regardless of good 
faith or want of damage to the corporation); id. § 894, at 384–86 (forfeiture of 
compensation in the discretion of the court). 
 91. See, e.g., 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 206, at 252–54; Richard V. 
Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries–Is Rothko Right?, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 95, 96 (1978) (criticizing courts that surcharge “a disloyal fiduciary 
for a sum exceeding amounts causally related to the breach”). 
 92. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000); see generally Gary, supra note 85, at 632–33 
(discussing the background and intent of § 4958). 
 93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).  See John H. Langbein, 
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L. REV. 105 
(1994) (discussing the move from the nondelegation rule to a more pro-delegation 
rule). 
 94. See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE 
PRUDENT MAN RULE 152–57 (1986). 
 95. UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 15–48 (2003).  
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act was adopted by Alaska in 1998 and is 
currently still in force;  ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.225–.290 (2006). 
 96. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994), 7B U.L.A. 15–48 (2003). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2003).  See generally Gary, supra 
note 85, at 600–03 (describing the history of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
and reasons for its adoption into the Restatement). 
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corporation’s officers the day-to-day and month-to-month 
management of the corporation’s business and affairs.  They 
delegated board functions to groups of their own number, that is, 
director committees.  Over time, the list of matters that could not 
be delegated has become smaller.98  Seemingly, under the most 
recent versions of the Model Business Corporation Act, a board 
committee could count a non-director as a member.99 
VI.  GOVERNANCE IN A TRUST OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP 
Governance in a corporation and a trust may still be different 
in some key respects, but at least one point is clear.  Akin to 
corporations, trusts may control significant assets and business 
operations and the governance tools needed are by and large 
common to both forms of legal entity.  The seminal example is 
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate. 
A. Background 
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate became fantastically wealthy.  In the 
1950s, the trust already was “by far the biggest private landholder 
in the state.  Its name was on one of every nine acres . . . .”100  
Successive land booms in Hawaii “push[ed] land values higher and 
higher, in some cases by 1,000 percent, then 2,000 percent . . . .”101 
Cash flow began to match rises in asset values. 
Successive surges in revenue coincided with the malefactions 
of the Bishop Estate trustees.  The trustees mis-invested the money 
that came into their hands.102  They mismanaged not only the trust 
but also the Kamehameha School, the trust’s principal beneficiary. 
The trustees began shading over from micromanaging to officious 
intermeddling in the beneficiary’s affairs.  Mis-investment aside, 
the trustees oversaw subordinates’ waste of trust assets on 
 
 98. Compare BRANSON, supra note 15, § 4.30, at 204–07 (describing how 1984 
Model Business Corporation Act listed eight matters that a full board could not 
delegate to a committee), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(e) (2005) (listing 
only four matters that may not be delegated under current Model Act). 
 99. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005) (“[A] board of directors may 
create one or more committees and appoint one or more members of the board of 
directors to serve on any such committee.”).  This phrasing seemingly permits 
non-directors to be members of board committees. 
 100. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 53.  At its high point, Bishop Estate held 
fee simple title to 440,184 acres.  Id. at 32. 
 101. Id. at 53. 
 102. Id. at 195–97.  A single investment in 1991-93 of $500 million in Goldman 
Sachs turned out to be a “home run.”  Bishop Estate realized $1.5 billion upon 
Goldman’s initial public offering in 1999.  Id. at 197–99, 255. 
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expenditures that served no business purpose.  Lastly, a principal 
item of waste was the remuneration the trustees had the trust pay 
them, exceeding $1 million per year for what were part-time 
positions.103 
Similar to some ANCSA corporations, the Bishop Estate, a 
trust, shifted from operation as a charity to a partnership to a 
political entity. 
B. Hoarding Assets 
Over ten years, the Bishop Estate trustees saw to it that the 
trust accumulated $350 million in liquid assets, “five times a single 
year’s operating budget” for the Kamehameha Schools.104  At the 
same time, Kamehameha rejected eleven out of every twelve 
applicants.105  Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service assessed the 
trust large amounts of taxes on “unrelated business income” 
because the Bishop Estate trustees placed excess cash in operating 
entities using business corporations as their legal form.106 
C. Mis-investments 
In the late 1980s, the financial consultants to the trust 
proposed “a well-diversified portfolio of marketable securities . . . 
professionally managed and [which] took full advantage of Bishop 
Estate’s tax exempt status”:107 
The trustees, however, took a different route.  With the proceeds 
from land sales during the 1980s and 1990s the trustees set up tax 
paying companies, wholly owned by the Bishop Estate, that 
actively pursued “special-situation investments” [oil drilling, a 
golf course, commercial real estate].  These were private 
business deals that offered the potential of large gains 
somewhere down the road with the likelihood of little or no 
income in the meantime.  They tended to be risky, illiquid, and 
not easily managed . . . .108 
Effectively operating the trust as a private equity firm, the trustees 
bet that by investing in operating businesses, they could reap larger 
profits, even after paying ordinary income taxes on “unrelated 
 
 103. See id. at 54–55, 100, 190–91, 201–02.  For a significant period of time, 
“[e]ach trustee was taking nearly $1 million in annual trustee fees and enjoying the 
perks of a Bishop Estate trustee, such as the offer of free membership at exclusive 
golf courses . . . .”  Id. at 76. 
 104. Id. at 200 
 105. Id. at 201. 
 106. Id. at 197. 
 107. Id. at 81–82. 
 108. Id. at 82–83. 
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business income,” than they could with a portfolio of passive 
investments and no income taxes.  Overall, they lost that bet.109  In 
one window alone, 1994 to 1996, Arthur Andersen found that the 
Bishop Estate lost $2 million or more in forty-seven investments.110 
D. Micro-management 
To justify trustee compensation that exceeded $1 million per 
trustee per year, the trustees clung to the “‘lead trustee’ system.”  
“[T]rust functions and areas of responsibility were divvied up 
among the Bishop Estate trustees.”  Each trustee was responsible 
for one of five areas:  asset management, education and 
communication, government affairs, legal affairs, and alumni 
relations.  One trustee had a staff of thirteen employees.111 
Experienced persons urged the trustees to accept one of two 
alternatives.  The first option was to leave the management of the 
schools to the principal and his staff.  The second option was to 
hire a CEO and to adopt a corporate-style model, with the five 
trustees acting as a board of directors that would oversee 
management by senior executives rather than attempting to 
manage the charity themselves.  The trustees turned deaf ears to all 
proposals.112 
E. Officious Intermeddling 
Corporate directors do not necessarily violate their duty of 
care by micromanaging.  Damage to the corporation is an element 
of the cause of action.  Until damages result, duty-of-care 
violations are in the air, so to speak, and are not actionable.113  The 
trustees of the Bishop Estate, however, did harm the trust. 
One trustee set up an office for herself at Kamehameha 
School.  She forced the school to abandon the five-year contracts it 
 
 109. See id. at 195–98. 
 110. Id. at 195.  The duty of care has also been the means by which 
shareholders have attacked purposeful acts that, while not venal, make little sense.  
See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 76–78 (N.Y. 1880) (directors exhausted 
remaining funds on new building).  Not only did the Bishop trustees cause the 
trust to make bad investments, thus violating their duty of care in investing on the 
trust’s behalf, but the trustees also violated their duty of loyalty.  For example, 
trustees made personal multi-million dollar investments in a Texas coal bed 
methane natural gas project, MacKenzie Methane.  The trustees then caused the 
trust to invest a further $85 million to prop up a failing venture in which they had 
personal investments.  KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 83. 
 111. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 97. 
 112. See id. at 86–87, 123–24, 164. 
 113. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.14. 
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had traditionally awarded, substituting year-to-year appointments 
that put everyone on the bubble each year.  In a noisy withdrawal, 
one valued teacher quit as a result of trustee intermeddling.114  
Others preceded and followed him, for similar reasons. 
In the mid-1990s, when the trustees changed the direction of 
the school’s outreach from an extension program to new schools, 
the schools had to hire new staff members.  Not only did a trustee 
insist upon review of all prospective hires, she allowed paperwork 
to sit on her desk for months.  The schools were able to begin 
hiring only seven weeks before they opened their doors, and were 
thus at a distinct disadvantage.115 
F. Waste of Assets 
Courts have defined “waste” as a transaction in which “‘no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that 
the corporation has received adequate consideration.’”116  The 
business judgment rule, which protects both directors and 
transactions from judicial scrutiny, does not extend its protections 
to acts or transactions found to have involved waste or gifting of 
corporate assets.117 
Waste by the Bishop Estate trustees included sixteen trips to 
Las Vegas by a trustee, who never once accounted for the trust 
funds she spent.118  Additionally, the trustees caused the trust to pay 
the defense costs of an employee who had been charged with a 
crime unrelated to his duties at the trust.119 
 
 114. See KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 109–10, 118–24. 
 115. Id. at 118–19. 
 116. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re The Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)); see also 
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 
A.2d 7, 26–27 (Del. Ch. 1982).  See generally BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.15. 
 117. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c), at 184 (1994); Fred W. Triem, 
Judicial Schizophrenia in Corporate Law: Confusing the Standard of Care with the 
Business Judgment Rule, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 23 (2007). 
 118. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
 119. Id. at 203.  Additionally, the trust was made to finance campaign expenses 
for friends of the trustees who had run for office.  Trustees forced Bishop Estate 
employees to sell tickets to political fundraisers to benefit friendly politicians.  The 
employees targeted the sale of tickets to firms that did “non bid” business with 
Bishop Estate.  In whole or in part, the firms could then recoup the cost of tickets 
through overcharging the trust for goods and services.  See id. at 203, 208.  In 
another case, the trustees caused payment of a $132,000 “consulting fee” to the 
speaker of the state house of representatives for his “services” in the purchase of 
land in upcountry Maui.  Id. at 223. 
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Despite the existence of an in-house legal staff to aid them, the 
trustees expended millions of dollars to hire outside lawyers.120  
Yet, the trust had neither any policy with regard to employee or 
trustee conflicts of interest, nor rudimentary training in what 
fiduciary duties may require.121 
G. Trustee Compensation 
The tail that wagged the dog was the receipt by each trustee of 
$1 million in annual compensation.122  Trustees justified their 
compensation on the time they expended with the charity and 
hands-on involvement in the choice of investments,123 neither of 
which any trustee should be doing in a trust the size of the Bishop 
Estate. 
Under English common law, of course, both trustee and 
corporate director positions were honorary in nature.  The law 
expected persons to serve in those capacities with no 
compensation.124  Compensation could be awarded if the trust 
instrument provided for it, but, overall, law provided that trustee 
compensation must be reasonable.125  And, as late as 1939, the New 
York courts held that corporate directors were neither employees 
 
 120. See id. at 98, 152, 207–08.  For example, Bishop Estate trustees expended 
trust funds for lobbyists to lobby against the proposed tax code (section 4958 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, enacted 1996) which would authorize the IRS to levy 
a twenty-five percent or greater excise tax upon an insider who, like the Bishop 
Estate trustees, had received “an excess benefit.”  The penalties are known as 
“intermediate sanctions,” in comparison to the ultimate sanction, revocation of a 
charity’s tax-exempt status.  See, e.g., Gary, supra note 85, at 632–34; KING & 
ROTH, supra note 7, at 210. 
 121. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 98.  Even the interim trustees, who took 
office after the probate court had removed the wrongdoers, hired the most 
expensive, and reputedly the best, legal experts (e.g., Professor John Langbein of 
Yale Law School and Professor John Luebsdorf of Rutgers) to justify the trustees’ 
positions and to take sympathetic views of the former trustees’ actions.  They 
expended $1 million in doing so.  Id. at 274–75. 
 122. See id. at 76. 
 123. See id. at 100. 
 124. See, e.g., RALPH D. WARD, 21ST CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD 43 (1997) 
(“From the late 1800s until well into the 1900s, outside investors considered their 
board service a matter of looking after their assets.  Such basic housekeeping was 
thought no more deserving of remuneration than balancing one’s own 
checkbook.”); IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 271–72 (“In 
England a trustee is not entitled to compensation for his services as trustee . . . .”  
Originally, the rule was the same in the United States). 
 125. See IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 274–75. 
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nor any other sort of agents.126  Thus, they had to look to statutory 
and contractual provisions for indemnification and other sorts of 
remuneration because the common law would not be construed to 
provide them.127 
In the not-for-profit, and particularly in the educational, 
sectors, the tradition continues that trustees serve without 
compensation.128  That is as true at Harvard University, with an 
endowment of $25.5 billion,129 as it is at an elite secondary school 
that resembles the Bishop Trust’s Kamehameha, the Milton 
Hershey School in Pennsylvania, with an endowment of $5.4 
billion.130  The answer of the Bishop Estate trustees was that by 
their involvement they acted as five co-CEOs.131  They analogized 
themselves to the five fingers of a single hand,132 akin to partners in 
a partnership. 
Neither the trustees nor those who supported them ever 
acknowledged the bizarre governance arrangement at Bishop 
Estate, with five trustees, legally holding part-time positions, being 
paid $1 million per year, who purported to manage, hands-on, a 
complex institution with over $10 billion in assets. 
H. Judicial Review of Directorial Versus Trustee Compensation 
As has been seen133 in the field of trusts, courts insist that the 
trustee’s compensation be reasonable.  By contrast, in the 
corporate field, courts have abandoned any meaningful role in the 
review of directorial or senior executive compensation.  In the not-
too-distant past, courts abdicated compensation decisions to boards 
of directors, reviewing the board or a board committee’s decision 
under the highly deferential business judgment rule, with one 
exception.134  Courts applied a loose control known as the 
 
 126. N.Y. Dock Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) 
(corporate directors are not agents; rather they are sui generis in the eyes of the 
law). 
 127. See IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 272–73. 
 128. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 100. 
 129. See id.; see also Governing Harvard, 108 HARV. MAG., May-June, 2006, at 
25, available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/050688.html. 
 130. See Shelly Branch, Trust Pushing Sale of Hershey Raises Level of Criticism, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B6. 
 131. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 100. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Triem, supra note 117, at 26–27. 
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reasonable relationship test.135  The test required that a court strike 
down compensation levels if they bore no reasonable relationship 
to the services or the benefit provided.136 
It was then up to the Delaware Chancery Court, in the bubble 
years of the 1990s, to abandon the reasonable relationship test and 
other standards of judicial review, perhaps altogether.  In a case 
involving an award of one million stock options to the CEO of 
Coca Cola as a gift in gratitude for past services, ordinarily 
considered a waste of corporate assets, Delaware Vice Chancellor 
Jack Jacobs held that, in effect, only the business judgment rule 
remains as a standard of judicial review.137  If directors had made a 
judgment or decision, were free of conflicts of interest in the 
matter, informed themselves to the extent they believed necessary, 
and had a rational basis for the decision made,138 courts could not 
review a decision, including a decision regarding compensation, for 
reasonableness.139 
Thus, although reasonableness remains a yardstick courts can 
utilize to review a trustee’s compensation, in corporate law at least, 
one authoritative court has abandoned the reasonableness test.140  
In a corporation, the business judgment rule rather than 
reasonableness has become the standard.  If directors and senior 
executives script it correctly, the compensation decision they reach 
will not be reviewable by a court in any meaningful sense. 
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate trust is a cautionary tale for trusts that 
begin to segue through the operating modus operandi of a number 
of different entities, without adhering to the principles of sound 
governance, which in reality apply to charities, trusts, corporations, 
many partnerships and LLCs, and other forms of entity. 
VII.  CONCLUSION:  INDETERMINACY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 
I used to think that choice of entity was a paramount concern, 
that continued adherence to a single form of entity was crucial.  I 
 
 135. The leading reasonable relationship case was Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 
585, 591 (1933), in which, pursuant to a bylaw containing a bonus formula, 
American Tobacco paid its senior managers bonuses equivalent to four to five 
times their annual salaries. 
 136. Id. at 591. 
 137. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 388 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 138. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – The Business 
Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 639–44 (2002) (discussing components of 
the rule). 
 139. See id. at 632, 639–44. 
 140. See id.; see also Zupnick, 698 A.2d at 388. 
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argued that, for better or worse, ANCSA corporations should 
pursue a business corporation analogy down the line.141 
In 1988, I attended a symposium in which the principal 
speaker, Thomas Berger, a former justice of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court, regaled listeners with tales of fiascos and 
management failures in ANCSA corporations in village after 
village.142  He laid all failures squarely at the feet of such 
organizations’ formation and operation as corporations, 
demonizing them in no uncertain terms. 
A Native American legal scholar stood to correct Justice 
Berger.  A corporation is merely a form of organization.  In this 
day and age, a Native American tribe functions as if it were 
organized as a corporation.  The council of elders serves as a board 
of directors, and the chief or head person much as a corporate 
CEO.  The days in which no democracy among members is heeded 
are gone.  Many of the modes of operation and the consequences 
that flow from the choice of legal entity have long since blurred.  A 
few remain distinct. 
Corporate governance, for example, has become governance.  
The structure and methods that have come to be accepted as ways 
in which business entities should organize are methods of 
organization and management.  Nothing in them limits their use to 
corporations, or to business entities.  Thus, “[governance under the 
proposed Restatement of Principles of The Law of Nonprofit 
Organizations] relies on the traditional corporate model of 
governance and accountability: a well-informed, independent 
board.”143  “[I]n line with the modern judicial view, [the proposed 
Restatement] generally conforms charity fiduciary duties to the 
corporate standard. . . .  Despite the differences in terminology, the 
corporate and trust law standards of conduct do not seem to differ 
in substance.”144 
Thus, there exist nuances that may necessitate an awareness of 
differences among legal treatments of entities, and perhaps some 
 
 141. Branson, supra note 2, at 131–32. 
 142. Thomas Berger, Speech at the American Association of Law Schools 
Annual Meeting (Jan. 1988).  Berger has also written on this matter.  See THOMAS 
BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW 
COMMISSION (1985).  The author of this article reviewed Berger’s book.  Douglas 
M. Branson, ANCSA and 1991:  A Framework for Analysis, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 197 
(1987) (book review).  In addition, a response to this book review was published 
in the same issue.  Case, supra note 6 (book review). 
 143. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 25, at 
xxx. 
 144. Id. at xxxi–xxxii. 
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small differences in management methods as well, between trust 
and corporation, or political entity, charity, or tribe for that matter.  
The differences, though, are becoming smaller.  Indeed, focus on 
perceived differences in the applicable law may obfuscate the most 
valuable lesson. 
Setting those differences, whatever they may still be, aside, 
corporate governance is governance and little, if at all, about 
corporations themselves.145  Governance is a bundle of tested 
structures and methods for organizing and managing the affairs of 
larger entities.  Having regard for that principle, together with the 
lessons learned from the Enron, WorldCom and other debacles, 
can point the way to best practices for endowments, charities, 
trusts, not-for-profit entities, as well as business organizations, 
including ANCSA corporations. 
 
 145. Mr. Chief Justice Veasey has stated: 
All good corporate governance practices include compliance with 
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties.  But the law of 
corporate fiduciary duties . . . [is] distinct from the aspirational goals of 
ideal corporate governance practices.  Aspirational ideals of good 
corporate governance practices for boards of directors that go beyond 
the minimal legal requirements . . . are highly desirable, often tend to 
benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation, and can usually help 
directors avoid liability.  But they are not required by the corporation 
law and do not define standards of liability. 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). 
